Policy Paper Presented in The COLUMBIA SPECTATOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS JOURNAL
February 1994
US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW WORLD DISORDER
by Ramona Calin, MIA candidate, Columbia University, School of International
and Public Affairs
Given the nature of the chaotic political framework of today's
world configuration, there don't seem to exist clear, elegant
solutions for today's US' interests in the world. James Schlesinger
believes that "The United States has strength to spare in
responding to individual challenges, yet it clearly lacks the
overall strength to respond to all challenges. It should avoid
the heady feeling induced by its triumph in the Cold War, that
all things are now possible. It must learn, in this altered context
in which there are no major rivals, to husband its strength and
to choose with care those policy objectives that reflect interests
sufficiently weighty that they can garner the public support to
sustain them in the long run." Western analysts very often
share this theory of the nice, peaceful and stable era of the
Cold War. But, was the Cold War era indeed such a nice, neat epoch?
This remains a very controversial issue. In its eyes of a hegemonic
democracy career, the US had the immense satisfaction of seeing
the overthrow of communist governments in Eastern Europe and the
demise of the Soviet Union. At that time, this represented a glorious
solution for both "rescued" Eastern European peoples
and the "saviour" US. The solution seemed to have appeared
from the tunnel of 40 years of Yalta- negotiated Eastern European
sufferance and US triumph in the age of the Cold War.
The "nice guys" won over the "bad guys" and their triumphant
preaches redeemed the all-gloomy forgotten eastern part of the
European continent. And all of a sudden the US confronts itself
with the question of how to face this new "altered context"
where the bad guy's power had strongly diminished and the US should
use all its tools to continue framing the New World disorder.
The world seems to have somehow adjusted itself to listen to its
"wise" young saviour, to hope for its democracy recipes
and its inconsistent interventions. But are all nations indeed
capable or desirable to respect and accept their young fellow's
example of democracy? Is US' imperialism, driven by the "Empire
of Liberty concept, its idea of enlargement to propagate democratic
ideas and to spread US saviour recipes a feasibility? The end
of the Cold War seems to have finally represented this feasibility
for a very short while. But many subjects from "the other
side of the gate" seem to continue being very susceptible
and question US type of recipes for democracy, freedom and welfare.
As the French author Alexis de Toqueville used to write over a
century and a half ago: "It is in the conduct of their foreign
relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to
other government... A democracy can only with great difficulty
regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere, in
a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious
obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await
their consequences with patience.... The exercise of foreign policy
requires ability to use a measured application of energy and power.
Americans would never be able to do that. They will never be able
to do this global exercise." To conclude, with the demise
of the Soviet Union and the end of neatly defined leadership and
policy doctrines, US foreign policy is left in a confusing environment.
The New World disorder becomes like a nebulous mixture of multinational
entities and fast growing regional powers, as a result of mainly
the new media and communications technology.
The international spread of power resulted in more regional zones
of power. Nations that were propped up by Cold War relations have
separated or even split. While many emerging governments are facing
collapse, multinational institutions, as well as Trans - national
entities are succeeding to forge economic alliances across territorial
borders. In the new world, which seems to become one of complex
interdependence, with a wider hierarchy of actors that doesn't
want itself any longer limited to the mere role of state bureaucracy,
each upcoming entity should grow able to pursue its own goal.
In this amalgam of goals the outcomes will be less predictable.
Multinational institutions will teach the US to re-evaluate its
foreign policy and distinguish from the "us" and "the
others" pattern, and try to reconcile mutual (our-and-their)
interests. But where are we at today? We could place US foreign
policy almost back in 1913, when before his inauguration, President-elect
Woodrow Wilson told his friends: "It would be an irony of
fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs".
There is a little doubt that President Clinton would echo this
sentiment. But as Bosnia, Haiti and Russia show, there is no escape.
"President Clinton seems to receive backward-looking advice,
since he fails to take account of the dramatic changes in the
world and the deterioration of domestic finances, opening a gap
between rhetoric and performance. This damages once again American
already feeble credibility. The nation is entitled to something
better. The President should have the convictions and demand the
real changes that he was elected to bring about." "Elected
to solve the domestic crisis, neglected by his predecessor, the
new president of the United States found himself confronted with
a multitude of troubled spots on the planet. President Clinton
indicated that he ignores neither the strategic interests, nor
the economical difficulties of his planet. Could he aid the states
of the former Soviet Union, as much as he deems it necessary?
He also expressed the wish to preventthe proliferation of armament.
Is he ready to accelerate the reconversion of the enormous American
military industry?" The contradictions start here... On one
hand, President Clinton intends to put into practice ideas adapted
according to "after the cold war". “Entering a
new era, we need a new vision, as well as the necessary power
to face the upcoming problems and threats." In his speech
in front of the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, like in
many other upcoming ones, President Clinton presented a large
span of objectives:
a) the promotion of democracy and of
b) the free market economy of Eastern Europe and that of the former
Soviet Union,
c) the reinforcement of the democratic institutions and of the
respect for human rights in Africa, Asia and Latin America;
d) the prevention of the spread of the advanced weapons
e) the intensification of the international efforts in favour
of limits on environmental degradation, etc.
In order to accomplish these plans, President Clinton would need
to perform an active foreign policy, which represents an important
aid, as well as the occasional use of force. On the other hand,
President Clinton tries to concentrate his energy and resources
to revitalise the American economy. "I will sweep this economy
like a laser and the foreign policy will be only determined in
function of its impact to the economy" , he declared in November,
1992. This priority pushes him to limit the expenses of foreign
aid and avoid the participation in long-term conflicts. A budgetary
deficit of $300 milliard dollars for the fiscal year 1993, is
also preventing the US from engaging itself in expensive foreign
interventions. But how to reconcile these irreconcilable priorities?
If President Clinton wants to properly accomplish all these foreign
affairs issues, he would by no means be able to become "
the laser ray" of the economy; and if he allows the economic
problems to dictate their rule to diplomacy, he will not be able
to attain the other above mentioned objectives. Therefore, hard
choices impose themselves, while the United States are, mainly
for economic reasons, less able than before to exercise their
power. Should the United States do what president Grant used to
believe: involve themselves military more aggressively? The Clinton
administration would like to avoid the direct military intervention
in the apparently unsolved crisis: these interventions will deprive
considerably the new economic plan and might have negative domestic
political consequences. The polls prove the fact that the US opinion
wants the current administration to focus its energy on economy
".
The Americans have today even less taste for the role of a world's police
man than during the cold war." But the new vision that President
Clinton envisages risks to create an even stronger confusion about
the role the US has played in the past, of dealing with aggressions
and violence abroad. The main important task of the presidency
is to define a foreign policy based on the promotion of democracy
and human rights. And to accomplish this aim " We should
use all our economic power, our values and if necessary, our military
force" I will only make use of two very controversial examples:
The crisis in Haiti is becoming more and more serious, both because
of the political situation in Port au Prince, where people in
the administration showed a lack a of experience of the exercise
of power, and also due to the large flow of refugees trying to
enter the US by boat. While preparing his campaign, President
Clinton has criticised the returning of the boats to Haiti, "
If I were president, I would, in absence of a clear and compelling
evidence that they weren't any political refugees- give them temporary
asylum until we restored the elected government of Haiti"
. But confronted with a massive immigration, he had to change
his policy and follow former president Bush's actions, after stating
"I am appalled by the decision the Bush administration took
in respect to the Haitian refugees". Although very recently,
the policy towards Haitian refugees seems to have become more
lenient, it is hard to predict how consistent it will be. The
examples of both Haiti and Somalia may have well found conditions
for humanitarian concerns, but their "handling" has
proved that the US has no patience for failure and thus prefers
to withdraw from an already "established" scene.Another
important problem the United States needs to solve is that of
the attitude towards the ethnic and religious conflicts, in parts
of the world such as the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Horn
of Africa. The United States are already involved in these conflicts;
President Clinton and his administration need to decide on which
approach he will take and how he will respect his promises. As
far as the former Yugoslavia is concerned, the case of Bosnia
has shown the limits, of power, both military and political in
the post Cold-War era. What kind of credibility can the US hope
for in a situation where its media presented a one-sided story
of this never-ending crisis? By ignoring this lesson and failing
to order a de novae review of the resources devoted to foreign
policy- something that the European allies have not succeeded
either despite their much closer proximity to the zone of stability-
the US was somehow left with a somewhat comfortable excuse of
merely interfering in the conflict. Where is the US morality in
this crisis, where US arms supplied to the Bosnian Muslims do
no more than, in the words of Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd,
"greatly increase the killing and the length of the war?"
And to continue speaking of morality and its inherent total commitment
definition, eliminating half measures, if the US is called upon
to counter genocide in Bosnia, then they should deliver, even
if that means ground troops, casualties and tremendous expenditures.
Morality is also timeless. If on moral grounds, Warren Christopher
rejected the safe heavens in Bosnia one week, he can not logically
or credibly withdraw his objection a month later. The reason why
I stressed upon these two different-in-content crisis, is that
of their somewhat similarity in being acted upon in such frustrating,
inconsistent ways.
The US has no patience for failures ... Advocates of placing
morality at the centre of foreign policy often dismiss the issues
of total commitment versus half measures as irrelevant to anything
except a petty consistency. " They assert that in the manner
of a hospital emergency room, it is possible to perform triage
on international problems and come up with a list of priorities.
This, of course, goes to the crux of the question: Where do morality
and practicality meet?" The new world order referred to by
former President George Bush is seen by some as a marriage of
decency: democracy and human rights and real politick, a combination
of tensions between real politick and idealism. These tensions
between morality and practicality are far from being solved. As
US interests become more global, foreign policy must inevitably
look for multilateral tools to use. US-built international institutions,
such as the UN, will still provide a framework for US foreign
policy and values. Today's UN though, reached the fatigued days
of once the League of Nations, and even with Secretary General's
Boutros Boutros-Ghali "final acclaim" for restructuring,
it needs a while before being able to confront its new role of
a peace keeper, world guardian and succeed on field, such as it
surprisingly did in Cambodia. The US plays a weighty role in peacekeeping
operations.
By participating in UN peacekeeping, the US is able to promote
the goals of world peace and stability through collective security
- the notion that a strike against one is a strike against all-
But multilateral peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN presents
drawbacks as well as a good means of operating in a global set-up.
The main drawbacks would be: the loss of American lives, the financial
expenditure and the condition that US troops need to operate under
foreign command. How could the world's sole remaining military
superpower allow non-allied countries to determine US force over
the planet? These realist concerns although somewhat valid are
not valid enough to allow the support of uni-lateralism, instead
of that of US participation in UN peacekeeping missions. The realist
concerns though, should be able to overcome their isolationist
concerns and balance domestic group’s interests against
international group interests. The use of force might become irreplaceable
in future US foreign policy. Working through the UN will diminish
the necessity of aggressive action. The realists need to understand
this.
Defence spending in the United States, as in any other country
is a public policy choice that has a very direct impact on domestic
welfare. It is usually predicated on real or anticipated threats
to the people, not on open-ended commitments to accept responsibilities
that worsen the domestic economic arena. This is another reason
why the US should use force unilaterally only in cases where military
aggression remains the only feasible solution to protect US' direct
security, their frontiers and strong interests.
In an effort to maintain US military hegemony, President Clinton
and Secretary of Defence Les Aspin have expressed their wish to
set in place new armament systems, amongst which the plane/helicopter
V-22 Osprey, the cargo plane C-17 and the submarine SSN-21. These
systems are necessary if the United States wish to conserve their
technological updating and continue to initiate themselves in
the aerospacial sector. But while the presidency is hoping to
spend funds to diminish credits in the field of nuclear weapons
and in programs connected with NATO, the continuous augmentation
of the federal deficit might determine Clinton's administration
to reduce military expenses more than they might wish to. Another
foreign policy objective is the prevention of the spread of advanced
weapons. By becoming very active in this respect, president Clinton
risks to annoy some of the principal commercial partners of the
United States; he also risks to worsen relationships with Russia
and China even more; these two countries might most likely refuse
any new restriction of arms sales. President Clinton, as well
as the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence and the chief
of CIA are partisans of a strict action in the objective of the
prevention of the advanced weapons. The President, will without
any doubt, open negotiations in order to plan a deadline for the
nuclear experiences, which will facilitate the renewal of the
prevention treaty that will be examined in 1995. New problems
risk to continue arising in the US relationship with its allies
and commercial partners. As proven by the Iraqi "affair",
the main difficulty lies in the fact that certain exportations
have a double usage: computers, scientific technological tools
could carry a double usage: both a military and a civil one. The
US leaders would like to forbid the flux towards countries such
as Iran and Pakistan. But the majority of Washington's allies,
amongst which Japan and the NATO nations are against such restrictions,
at this stage in time of economic hardship. If the US wants to
preserve their policy, they might risk their commercial relationship
with their main allies. The same applies to the relationship with
Peking and Moscow; two capitals which are trying hard to make
use of arm sales to obtain necessary tools for their development.
In the past, Russia and China delivered their engines to Oriental
regimes whose policy was against the Western world (Iran, Iraq,
Libya, and Syria). Having reached this stage, the US confronts
itself once again with the need for extended diplomatic relations,
thus striking at maintaining a balance in its conflicting interests.
Real politick promoters and realist arguments find it hard to
adapt themselves to the idea of an eventual sometimes harmonious
globally integrated world, where the US role will be that of a
hegemonic mediator, as opposed to that of a mediocre "king".
The US, as the most multiethnic society on the planet, has proved
that it has the generous capacity to set an example that like
its various citizens, nations should also be able to work together
to protect world's stability, by protecting their own interests,
as well as global interests. Since today's media impact became
a huge tool to drive US foreign policy, although any foreign policy
should have the support of the public, these policies should not
be dictated by public opinion and fully controlled by media. In
general, a policy created by the public opinion is more noticeable
when it fails. And so many policies fail ... Therefore, there
is a need for more consistent, clearer policies. The US seems
to have the impression and ultimately the expectation to solve
all crises. When policy fails, public's confidence diminishes.
Also, public's understanding becomes more and more confused by
the inconsistent coverage. On the other hand, since media is such
a serious tool for foreign policy, a more spread international
coverage, extended to more US readers/listeners will make the
people more respondent/ interested in international concerns.
While this strategy will take a long time and will bare a painstaking
implementation, it will serve its purpose in the long run. Wilson's
world order model has been the use of education and cultural change
to promote democracy and human rights. World War 2 European destroyed
economies as well as education systems were rebuilt/reinvented
following this model. Today the US does have neither the capacity
nor the will to rebuild the whole world. But as Professor Jack
Snyder of Columbia University proposes an International Academy
for Nationalities Studies, as a solution to solve nationalistic
and ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, similar type of institutions,
in different fields of application could produce a framework for
less violence and warfare. If the United States will be able to
accept this new role of a hegemonic mediator, then less powerful
nations will be also forced to mature themselves in a globally
integrated world. This will of course, be a work of generations,
but a possible one. As the Mexican author and diplomat, Octavio
Paz wrote in his book "The Labyrinth of Solitude" "I
do not preach the return to the past, imaginary as are all pasts
... All nations must find their own modernity. They must invent
it. It is a task that requires not only favourable historic and
social circumstances but also an extraordinary imagination. The
rebirth of imagination, in the realm of art as in that of politics,
has always been prepared for and preceded by analysis and criticism.
I believe that this duty has fallen to our generation and the
next."
More than two generations might be required to reach this goal.
But it is probably the way in which humanity might survive. The
monopolist models never proved successful. Adopting the theory
of the comforting Cold War peaceful era is another illusion of
using the past as an invented framework for the disillusion of
the present. We need a new, global system; and the US-as the only
power who acquired the combination of economic, political and
military power to influence the global world scene- is to accept
and promote this globalism. Despite its security and geographical
isolation, the US is closely connected with the rest of the world
and so are its interests. In today's chaos, US interests are more
than ever interconnected with the interests of all nations across
the globe. Therefore, acting its role of a mediator by promoting
multilateral institutions, other policy areas would be shaped
as well. The US, with its unique position to influence world development
should use its interests to mediate within "this altered
context in which there are no major rivals".
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Paz, Octavio. "Laberinto de Soledad"
Schlesinger, James. "Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy"
Alexis de Toqueville, "Democracy in America"Newspapers
& Magazines The Atlantic magazine, September 1993
Washington Post, 6 November, 1992
New York Times, Speech by President Clinton, 14 August 1992 OthersBosworth,
Stephen - Professor at the School of International and Public
Affairs, Columbia University, New York – lectures on Foreign
Policy
Klare, Michael. - Professor at Hampshire College, Amherst.
President Clinton - Electoral Campaign, May 27, 1992
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